Corruption as a Major Challenge in Newly Developing Kurdistan

Kawa Jabary

K. Jabary

Simon Fraser University
kawa2010@gmail.com

Abstract

Current research struggles to identify the factors that contribute to corruption in developing nations. In the process of development at large, corruption is a challenge that is affected by social factors. This paper hypothesizes that corruption is culturally supported, with citizens consider doing favors for each other as their responsibility. The paper argues that training programs, recruitment and education systems do not work in developing nations due to this public support to corruption. The paper presents Kurdistan, the newly developing region, in northern Iraq, as its case study. Even though this region is aggressively developing, corruption, nepotism, and favoritism are huge challenge in this process of development.

4 Introduction

Corruption in developing nations has been considered as one of the major issues that these nations face. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) represents a good example that has been challenged by corruption. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 48% of Iraqi citizens, including the residences in Kurdistan, pay bribe to speed up administrative procedures or better service from the public institutions (2013). On a scale of 1 to 175, one being the least and 175 the most corrupt, the International Corruption Index also has ranked Iraq as the 171st state (2013). The Kurdistan Region Reform Commission (KRRC) also states that under the KRG, the political appointees in this regional government have been a way for selecting administrators in the public institutions. The KRG itself has publicly confirmed that the findings from the KRRC's study are accurate and the public institutions in Kurdistan have been challenged by corruption (2012).

This paper seeks to understand the sources and the types of corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan. By examining these two aspects of corruption, this study contributes to furthering research on corruption and understanding this problem in the developing nations in two ways. First, it enables us to understand the nature of corruption that exists under the KRG's authority in Kurdistan. Second, it allows us to identify whether the political parties and the ruling elites should only be held accountable for having such a high level of corruption in Kurdistan. Knowing the factors that contribute corruption in Kurdistan is important because the existing literatures mostly focus on the ruling class that abuses authority for personal gains in the developing nations, while ordinary citizens suffer and complain about it. However, very little known about ordinary citizens' contribution to this negative phenomenon in the developing nations. This study argues that by providing support to the corrupt ruling elite and in return receiving free salaries, and different types of grants, ordinary citizens have given corruption a different meaning in Kurdistan. It has become a way of exchanging favors between citizens and officials under the KRG's leadership.

Explaining this relationship is important because the current literature ignores the social support for such negative phenomena in the developing countries. This study also argues that one way to deal with corruption is by improving governing capacity through the performance of civil servants.

First, this paper will provide some overviews on the common types of corruption, the political conditions that foster corruption, and the type training methods that can be implemented to fight corruption. Second, this study will provide a brief background of the creation of the KRG. Providing this background is significant because it places the issue of corruption in its historical context. This part also touches on the key areas that have been shaped by past events and address the ones that remain relevant to the challenges that the KRG is currently facing.

In particular, this section will discuss the type of corruption that has been happening in the KRG's institutions, boards and agencies. Thirdly, this research will examine the KRG policies such as training courses, educational activities, and a good recruitment system in its public sector as ways of putting a stronger hand on corruption in the public sectors. The final part will conclude the study and suggest some recommendations that are essential for the developing nations, in particular the KRG, to decrease corruption.

4.1 Corruption, a Major Challenge for the Developing Nations

According to Kenny and Clarke (2010), some communities have high levels of corruption due to "their structural, political and resources impediments in their way" (p. 9). Other literature considers corruption as one of the major problems that is behind weakness in the governing performances (Lengeth, 2006; Brown, 2006). However, before reviewing literatures on the effect of corruption on a government's performance, it is important to provide some definitions of corruption and its types. According to Brown (2006), "corruption is the abuse of public and private power for private, personal, unlawful, financial, pecuniary profit, benefit and gain" (p. 59). Even though there might be a universal basic understanding of corruption, for the purpose of this study, I review some detailed acts of corruption as major challenges in developing nations.

According to Lengseth (2006), these acts of corruption include: (1) grand and petty, (2) active and passive, (3) embezzlement, theft and fraud acts of corruption. The petty and grand acts of corruption are challenging the capacity building process because while the former involves the distortion of the central functions of government, the latter exists in the context of established governance and social frameworks. Petty corruption is about receiving a small amount, and in return granting or making favors to civil servant's relatives using public position.

The active and passive acts of corruption perhaps do not need much explanation. While active corruption is about a payment of an offer that is accepted, passive is about an attempt that has not been accepted. The components of this type could be anything from giving out valuable documents or inside information, to sexual or other favors in return for direct or indirect benefits to the public employee. This is also a challenging phenomenon because one incident of corruption in one organization can encourage similar acts in other institutions. It could even become an acceptable act in the society. Last but not least, the "embezzlement" act of corruption involves conversion of cash, property or any valuable items by individuals who are not entitled to them, but due to his or her position, he or she has access to them (Langseth, 2006). These sorts of corruption are challenging because they slow down the attempts for establishing openness, justice, and efficiency in the public sector's institutions (ADB and OECD, 2006).

These definitions and approaches are important because they explain the differences between the types of corruption. However, as Baser and Morgan (2008) point out, since the level of complexities of some issues, such as corruption, relevant to public policy are different from one place to another, it could be a challenging assignment to assign a single approach that fits in all the environments. For example, public organizations and boards contain different types of actors with different types of skills that can affect the impacts and activities of these boards on the society. Thus, each nation's development must be studied in the light of its own circumstance (Hira and Parfitt, 2004; Smith, 1973). This point that these scholars embrace is important because the factors that contribute corruption are different under the political conditions of the developing regions in which developing an effective capacity is the target (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Hira and Parfitt, 2004).

However, despite the differences amongst the developing nations, it is important to review some of the literature on these political conditions and how they affect capacity development, as a mean for fighting corruption, differently.

4.2 Conditions that Promise Less Corruption

The literature mentions three important political conditions that are necessary for promising better transparency, responsibilities, and accountabilities in governments' activities. These conditions must also be supported by a strong political leadership that has a clear vision and agendas for developing its nation; and a strong political will that is eager to conduct all the necessary reforms, and apply the rules that are necessary for developing an accountable government (Dwivedi, 2002; Masciulli and Knight, 2009; Rotberg, 2012).

According to Dwivedi (2002), there are several characteristics that good political leadership should contain. These characteristics are showing responsibility and accountability not only for administrative procedures but also respecting the rule of law, and avoiding illegal activities. By being ethical, responsible, and accountable, the political leadership will be able to ensure that public servants and officials fulfill their responsibilities and prevent the abuse of power. Some other authors explain political leadership in the context of not only responsibilities, but also the need for leaders to be good, effective, and ethical (Masciulli and Knight, 2009). According to these authors, good political leadership should be determined and use efficiency in achieving its targeted goals. It should be adaptive, using different means in responding to its challenges, in particular corruption, and considering the short and long-term consequences of their actions. These characteristics of political leadership are important because they enable leaders to generate new perspective and invent new rules for new situations. According to Rotberg (2012), political leadership in developing nations plays a critical role because it "makes much more of a difference in every realm, in particular the political realm" (p. 16). However, even though some of the political leaders in the developing nations have been able to provide some level of stability, seeking private gains is still a visible phenomenon.

Thus, another condition for better capacity in managing the challenges, in particular corruption in the public institutions, is political will. According to Brinkerhoff (2000), political will is a complicated matter because it incorporates individuals, organizations, and governance systems and activities.

Individuals' political will involves motivations and capacities that they possess and practice through the governance systems of public institutions or organizations. For example, open democratic countries are more likely to have leaders with strong political will for reforms due to accepted rules of accountability and responsibility as foundations of their political systems. However, under authoritarian regimes, which most developing nations have had such regimes, political leaders are less willing to conduct reforms because they have leaders "whose will to tackle corruption is limited, superficial, or cynical" (Brinkerhoff, 2000, p. 244). In addition, under such regimes, there are limited chances to express concerns about corruption, and its negative impacts on the public in general.

Another condition that could promise less corruption is a stable political environment. This is important because public institutions and public servants do not perform their duties in a political or cultural vacuum (Brinkerhoff and Johnson, 2009; Eade, 1999). The state's institutions or personnel duties are determined by the extent of collaboration that exists within the political conditions that they have created. According to Eade (1998), a stable environment is one of the vital preconditions because empowering the public institutions to limit corruption is a slow process, not a shortcut for development.

Political stability is necessary because actors and organizations need a suitable operation space where legitimacy and political support are secured and not disrupted.

According to Duit and Galaz (2008), the Western democratic governments have been able to present good governing performances due to their stable political conditions upon which their "explorative and exploitive" capacities can flourish. Furthermore, Bourgon (2010) points out that this is the case because they have been able to create rules and principles without which it is impossible to present accountable model of governing. Through this process " A respect of the rule of law and public institutions, fairness, transparency and accountability for the exercise of powers and the use of public funds and public sector values... in serving the public trust, will exhibit integrity, probity and impartiality" (p. 205). Because of these values and principles, democratic governments have been able to create a stable environment upon which building further capacities is possible (Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010; Baser and Morgan, 2008). However, most developing nations lack political stability. As Baser and Morgan (2008) point out, the political systems that are more focused on their survival under unstable conditions lose the interest of pursuing the process of capacity development, which most of the times leads to lack of transparency and high level of corruption in the public sectors. Furthermore, fragile states could have capacity deficits because of ongoing ethnic, religious, and class-based groups deep divisions and conflicts that have offered limited opportunities for stability (UNDP, 2010). When these negative phenomena exist in these fragile states, stability moves towards failure, and the process of policy implementation faces more challenging environments (Brinkerhoff, 2010; Hira and Parfitt, 2004). Fred-Mensah (2004) mentions that unstable political environments encourage limited trust among public servants and politicians. In such distrusted political environments, there will be a very limited legitimate interaction between not only the government organizations and agencies but also between the public servants and ordinary citizens. In addition, if government organizations and agencies lack trust, they will not be able to act effectively in managing the challenges and difficulties that they face (Fred-Mensah, 2004). Berg and Hjerm (2010) refer to three types of political trust, but the most important of these is trust in institutional performance.

This is important because it explains trust in association with the tasks and performances of public organizations in unstable environment. This trust can only be built as a consequence of government's delivery of the services that the public's demand. However, what determines the capability of public organizations and their functions in trustful ways is the type of political structures that they function upon. As Brinkerhoff argues (2000), the central agenda for good governance is responsiveness to citizens' demands because citizens do not tolerate a political structure that does not foster accountability and transparency. This seems to be possible only in a stable political environment that can foster all the above requirements but not corruption.

4.3 Training Programs to Decrease Corruption

The literature on training programs as means of fighting corruption refer to various types of educational training to increase accountability in government's capabilities and performance. These training programs should be designed in a way to generate further capacities that government's policies are effective, and to encourage "stability, predictability and adaptability" (p. 15). Overall, they should be designed in a way to increase the level of capability and responsiveness of the public servants within public institutions (Klingner, 1996; Caiden, 1991).

However, according to the United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008), the success of educational and training programs also rely on responsible agencies that identify and address the training needs for all the government's ministries and institutions inclusively. Conducting the training under such agencies is necessary because they can provide inclusive training and support for all the administrative units that are required and expected to demonstrate different types of skills and talents.

These training programs should be designed in a way to cover three areas: First, they should deliver preliminary training for junior and senior staff in the targeted public institution: Second, they should train these individuals for specific administrative occupations: Finally, they should not only provide these training programs continuously, but also to reinforce professionalism through these educational courses incessantly (UN- Department of Economic and Social Affair, 2008). According to UNDP, there are some other procedural activities that should be conducted in the process of educating public servants as a promising way to fight corruption.

However, there are several conditions that could limit the impact of educational training on the public servants' ability to learn how to perform better within the public sectors' organizations. According to the UN (2005), some of these challenges can come from the fact that each level in the public sector's organizations requires specific trainings that cannot be learned from general training programs. Furthermore, in the developing nations, the subjects and agendas in the training programs and courses sometimes are poorly related to the activities and challenges, specifically corruption, that the public organizations and institutes conduct or face. Therefore, it is vital for the governments and agencies that provide these training programs to make sure that all actors that are involved in these educational preparations agree on the target objectives of the need to be accomplished.

4.4 The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism in Iraq

To understand the roots of corruption in Kurdistan, as a newly developed region, it is important to provide an overview on the emergence of this region's political leadership. Kurdish nationalism as a political movement in Iraq arguably started in the late 1940s. However, this movement has been shaped by disagreements and competition between the key Kurdish political figures. The emergence of this negative political phenomenon within the Kurdish nationalism started upon Barzani's return from Iran. Barzani with some other Kurdish political figures formed the KDP in 1947. A short time after his return, and due to Sheik Ahmad's revolt, his brother, against the government of Iraq, "Barzani had little option but to fight his way out of Iraq and seek sanctuary in the USSR" (Gareth R. V. Stansfield, 2003, p. 66). Stansfield reports that the real leader of the KDP was Ibrahim Ahmad, who was popular among students and the intellectual elite in Iraq but received very little support from rural areas. When General Qassem removed the monarchy and established the Republic of Iraq, he legalized political freedom and invited Barzani to return to Iraq. However, when Barzani arrived, he was displeased with the socialist orientation that the KDP had developed during his exile under the leadership of Ahmad. General Qassem was annoyed by the amount of support that the communists and the KDP were jointly enjoying in Iraq. Thus, while Barzani went back to his tribal region, Barzan area that is located on the eastern side of the city of Duhok in Iraq, where he received enough support to challenge Ahmad, Qaseem attempted to limit the political freedom that the communists and the KDP were enjoying (Stansfield, 2003, Pp. 67-70).
In 1963, the Ba'ath party overthrew Qaseem from power aggressively. However, Barzani was able keep the KDP as a nonaligned force in this leadership change in Iraq. According to Stansfield, after the removal of Qaseem, a negotiation took place between Barzani and the Ba'ath regime in 1963 (Stansfield, 2003, Pp. 70-71).

In this negotiation, Abdul Salam Arrif, the new president of Iraq, ignored Ahmad and signed a treaty with Barzani to crush the Iraqi Communist Party that had a good relationship with Ahmad (David McDowall 316). The agreement that Barzani signed with the Ba'ath divided the central committee of the party; Barzani and his followers on one side, Ibrahim Ahmad, and his son in-law Jalal Talabani on the other (Stansfield, 2003, p. 71). Ahmad and his followers left the party, blaming Barzani for acting against the principles of the party (McDowall, 2000, p. 315).

The departure of these intellectual members from the party was a chance for Barzani to gain full control over the KDP (McDowall, 2000, p. 316). However, after the Ba'ath crushed the leftist groups and forced them to exile, it turned its attention towards its Kurdish ally, the KDP (Hanna Batatu, 1978, Pp. 390-400). In 1968, Ahmad Hassan Al-Baker replaced Arrif as the new president of Iraq and offered Barzani a deal to solve the Kurdish question. However, in that deal, the rich oil city of Kirkuk, which has been the main demand for the Kurds, was not included (Yildiz and Blass, 2003, Pp. 35-40). In 1971, the KDP rejected the deal and Barzani was left with no choice but return to the mountains of Kurdistan to resume his revolution. Barzani was able to continue his resistance for a short time because of the support that he received from Iran. However, in 1975, the president of Iraq, Al-Baker, signed a treaty with Iran to resettle the border disputes and in return the Iraqi regime asked Iran to stop its support for the Kurdish rebellion.

This agreement with Iran gave the Iraqi army enough room to destroy the KDP's guerillas and force Barzani to leave the mountains of Kurdistan and seek refuge in Iran (Stansfield, 2003, p. 70-79). The crash of the KDP was a golden opportunity for the party's former political bureau, particularly Jalal Talabani, the current leader of the PUK. Talabani with certain colleagues established their own political party, the PUK in 1975 (McDowall, 2000, p. 343). Through this new political party, these political figures carried on their rivalry challenges against the KDP.

4.5 The KDP and PUK

Most of the major problems, including corruption, of the Kurdistan regional government are associated with some major events that have occurred between the PUK and KDP. By studying these events, we can realize why the PUK and KDP have not been able to present a sufficient and accountable model of governing through the KRG.

One major point that has always constrained the ability of the Kurdish nationalism is disagreement between its charismatic leaders. This phenomenon of the Kurdish nationalists presented itself in "Barzani's decision to abandon the struggle [against the Iraqi regime] after his defeat in 1975, and Talabani's ability to make use of this division to start a new party, the PUK, to carry on the struggle for Kurdish autonomy" (David McDowall, 2000, p. 22). After this disagreement, these two parties not only became opponents, but also attacked each other on the daily basis (Ibid, Pp. 348-50). In addition, to prove itself as the main opposition force in the mountain of Kurdistan, the PUK was fighting the KDP, which was also fighting the Iraqi regime, Iran and the Iraqi army at the same time. These operations by the PUK, particularly against the KDP and Iran, were a relief for the Iraqi army to focus more on its war with Iran along its southern borders (Entessar, 2010, p. 98). Thus Saddam offered a ceasefire and reconciliation with the PUK in 1983.

Nevertheless, after a few months, the PUK realized that Saddam was playing with time but giving nothing to the Kurds. In 1984, the PUK broke the ceasefire and intensified its attacks against the Iraqi army. In addition, for the first time, the PUK made peace with the KDP under the leadership of Barzani's son, Massoud, to escalate its attacks against Saddam's regime . Talabani and Barzani also formed a coalition, the Kurdistan National Front (KNF) in 1986 (Entessar , 2010, Pp. 90-100).

With help from Iran, the PUK and KDP jointly attacked the city of Hallabja and forced the Iraqi army to withdraw from it. As revenge against the PUK and KDP, the Iraqi army attacked the city with chemical weapons, killing over 5000 Kurd civilians. Many citizens in the region still blame the two parties for beginning such a tragedy on their own people.

In 1988, when the war between Iraq and Iran ended, Saddam turned his attention to the Kurds, in particular the prohibited areas around the cities of Sulaymania, Kirkuk, Kalar, and Khanaqeen.

In this attack, Saddam captured thousands of the Kurds, persecuted and buried them in mass graves (Makyia, 1989, Pp. 6-8). This campaign destroyed the foundations of both parties, and the KDP and the PUK both left with a few members and resettled in Iran in 1989. However, these two political actors learned very little from their defeats and the distraction of their people because after a short time, they entered into another round of internal conflicts.

4.6 The Emergence of the KRG

After a Kurdish uprising in 1991, the Ba'ath regime withdrew from the Kurdish cities and the KNF took control over the Kurdish region. However, the KDP and the PUK's political differences affected the performance of the KNF negatively. Even though the PUK and the KDP agreed to form a decentralized government, the Kurdistan Regional Government, they both remained loyal to their parties and their "politburos" (Natali, 2010, p. 40). For instance, the KDP collected 85% of its revenues from taxation and customs generated by illegal trade at the Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border, estimated at $750 million annually. As well, the PUK in "the Sulamaniyah cigarette factory increased production from 1,200 to 144,000 packs from 1991 to 1997 (Natali, 2010, Pp. 40-45). However, neither parties returned these revenues to the KRG. Both of these two parties concentrated their efforts to enrich their parties through the selling heavy construction machines and collecting tariffs. In fact disagreement on who should control these revenues exposed the older rivalry between the PUK and the KDP.

After not reaching an agreement, the PUK and the KDP launched a civil war against each other in 1994. At the beginning of this conflict, the PUK was able to enforce the KDP out of Erbil city, but this victory did not last very long. In 1996, with help from the Iraqi army, the KDP was able to defeat and push the PUK out of the city of Erbil to the city of Sulaymaniyah. Along the PUK, all other small political parties also left the city of Erbil and joined the PUK in Sulaymaniyah city. After this conflict, both parties established two different cabinets of ministries, one in Erbil under the KDP, and the second one in Sulaymaniyah under the PUK (McDowall, 2000, Pp. 388-90). However, the only difference between these two cabinets was that the PUK's cabinet included those small political parties that left the city of Erbil, and the KDP along governed in its cabinet in Erbil.

This situation lasted until 1998, but in the wake of the U.S.'s invasion, the KDP and PUK agreed to create one single government. Nevertheless, in the process of creating this unified government, the KDP insisted on demanding the prime minster position in the new cabinet, and the position of the President of Kurdistan. Since Jalal Talabani was interested in becoming the president of Iraq, he agreed to give the KDP the positions they required (Mustafa 2005). In the 2005 Iraqi federal election, the KDP and the PUK participated together as one list, mixed their cabinets, and created a new government under the leadership of Nechervan Barzani, the grandson of Mustafa Barzani with his deputy from the PUK. After dividing the important positions, the KDP received the Presidency of Kurdistan and agreed to present Jalal Talabani as their candidate for the sovereign post in the Iraqi Federal Government (Unification Agreement, 2006).Even though both cabinets were mixed, through the important positions in the KRG, the PUK and the KDP pursue their party interests, and technically both cabinets existed within the KRG until the last election in September 2013. In this election the balance of power between the two main political parties has change, now the PUK's support has declined and it is ranked as the third political party, replaced by the change movement (KRG website, April 29, 2014).

4.7 Political Leadership that Created Unpromising Conditions

The KRG's governing challenges, in particular corruption, have deeper roots that have started with the arrival of two main political parties to power. After a Kurdish uprising in 1991, the Ba'ath regime, which was in power until 2003 in Iraq, withdrew from the Kurdish cities.

After this withdrawal, the Kurdistan National Front (KNF), which included all the Kurdish political parties but dominated by the KDP and the PUK, took control over the Kurdish region. However, the KDP and the PUK's political differences affected the performance of the KNF negatively from this early stage. Even though the PUK and the KDP agreed to form a decentralized government, the KRG, they both remained loyal to their parties and their "politburos". For instance, the KDP collected 85% of its revenues from taxation and customs generated by trade at the Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border, estimated at $750 million annually. As well, the PUK in the Sulamaniyah cigarette factory increased production from 1,200 to 144,000 packs from 1991 to 1997, and collected tariff from the goods entered to the region through its border with Iran (Denise, 2010). However, neither returned these revenues to the KRG. Both of these two parties also concentrated their efforts to enrich their parties through selling heavy construction machines of the state.

In fact, disagreement over the distribution of these revenues intensified competition between the KDP and the PUK. After not reaching an agreement, the KDP and the PUK launched a civil war against each other in 1994. At the beginning of this conflict, the PUK was able to expel the KDP from the city of Erbil, the current capital city of the Kurdistan province, but this victory did not last very long. In 1996, with help from the previous Iraqi army, the KDP was able to defeat and expel the PUK out of Erbil, forcing it to retreat to the city of Sulaymaniyah (Denise, 2010).

After this conflict, both parties established two different cabinets of ministries, one in Erbil under the KDP, and the second in Sulaymaniyah under the PUK (McDowall, 2000). However, the difference between these two cabinets was that while the PUK's included some small political parties in its new cabinet without ministerial structure, the KDP governed its cabinet in Erbil in which some level of governing structure existed (Stansfield, 2003).

This situation lasted until 1998, but in the wake of the U.S.'s invasion, the KDP and PUK agreed to create one single government. Nevertheless, the attempt to create this unified government lasted until the invasion of Iraq without any achievement. In 2005, the KDP and the PUK participated together as one list in the first election in Iraq. They mixed some ministries of their cabinets, and created a new government under the leadership of Nechervan Barzani, who is the nephew of Masuod Barzani, the leader of the KDP, and the current president of the KRG, with a deputy from the PUK (Denise, 2010). Under a power sharing deal the important positions were split 50/50, the KDP received the Presidency of Kurdistan.

The KDP agreed to nominate Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK, as their presidential candidate for the sovereign post of the Iraqi Federal Government (Unification Agreement, 2006). Even though both cabinets were mixed, the PUK and the KDP pursued their party interests through the KRG's institutions (Denise, 2010). Technically, there were two cabinets within the KRG. This division within the KRG was probably one of the major factors that limited the government's capacity of delivering services and presenting a sufficient model of ruling.

In 2009, the Kurdistan region held its second election in which the KDP and the PUK run jointly as one list. Another fact about the 2009 election was that 24 lists ran for 111 seats of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA).

Along these political parties, three individuals, Masud Barzani, Kamal Merawdali, and Husain Garmyani, ran for the position of the president of Kurdistan. Barzani won the victory.

For a long time, the KDP and the PUK managed the public services in Kurdistan through administrators who were members of these two major parties. Due to this system of direct political appointees, the civil service functioned very poorly and there were shortages in services in almost all the institutions in Kurdistan (Denise, 2010). This dysfunctional nature of both cabinets was perhaps because changes in the central agencies and ministerial departments were decided upon directly by the political leaders from both political parties, the KDP and the PUK. For instance, without considering skill or required capacity, these changes were taking place in the public institutions under both cabinets. This type of mismanagement of human resources diminished these proposed policies and "the initial identification of the policy direction" (Stansfield, 2003, p. 167). This means that, even though both cabinets claimed that they attempted to improve their administrations by assigning qualified individuals to the public service positions, inefficiency, and the lack of designated budget and professionalism let down any attempt to reform the administration systems (Stansfield, 2003).

4.8 Poor Institutional Structures

Under the KRG's leadership, there have been seven ministry cabinets (KRG, 2012). However, due to the lack of enough records about the KRG's institutional reforms in public sector before 2005's election, we will only be able to discuss some changes that have taken place under the KRG's sixth cabinet, from 2005 to 2009, and seventh cabinet from 2009 to present.

These attempts for improving its performance include involving two ministries, the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR). As one of the major attempts to improve its performance, the KRG established the Ministry of Planning in 2006. On paper this ministry has several directories but only Human Resources Development and Development Coordination and Cooperation (DCC) are directly involved with improving or developing capacities.

This directory has established an institute under the name of Kurdistan Institute of Public Administration (KIPA). The establishment of KIPA seems to be important for the KRG, however, except for some training courses; it is not clear what has been accomplished through this agency regarding governing capacity development as a mean for decreasing the level of corruption.

As mentioned earlier, the establishment of the Ministry of Planning put it in charge to provide y building, others htraining and programs for improving the performance of the employees in the public institutions. The central objectives of the training were developing the foundations of progress, and upgrading the skills of the public employees to administrate better capacities throughout the public institutions in Kurdistan (KRG-MOP, 2012).

Furthermore, to achieve these goals, the Ministry of Planning was supported and helped by some international agencies. These agencies included the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the United States Agency International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP), the European Training Technology Center (UTTC), and the National School of Government (NSG) from the UK. While some of these NGOs have provided training and workshops for capacitave helped the KRG to implement various projects to improve its governing capacity.

Despite conducting all these courses and training programs, these training courses have not been effective due to several reasons. First of all, the process of selecting the public servants to participate in these programs is insufficient. Officials in the KRG's institutions show little proclivity for sending the targeted employees to attend these programs.

Favoritism in selecting the employees also is a major challenge; the high ranking officials send few ordinary employees to these local training courses but reward their friends or family members with the scholarships programs that send employees to study abroad. Some of these individuals have traveled to many countries several times just because they are related to general managers or high rank officials (KRRC, 2012). However, even though these NGOs have provided some training, according to a report on corruption and integrity that is conducted by UNODC (2013), only 7% of employees in all the KRG's ministries have received anti-corruption training.

4.9 Corruption in the Recruitment System of the KRG

The recruitment system is the major source for corruption in Kurdistan. This is due to the fact that "the KRG has become the largest employer in the region, providing monthly employment stipends to an estimated 1.5 million people in the public sector" (Denise, 2010, p. 91). However, due to lack of information, it is not clear where all these employees are positioned. Despite this lack of information about where these employees are positioned, it seems that mass recruitment in the public sectors is still conducted through the Prime Minister's office once a year.

In the recruitment process, decisions are mostly made based on who need jobs but not on the skills that the KRG's Ministries are in need. This is due to the fact that there is no job description within the KRG's institutions. Because of this system of mass recruitment, the government has become so big that any transaction in the public institutions has to go through many channels and faces a great deal of delay. Until 2010, it has been reported that individuals found about public positions through their personal connections or relative who are officials in government offices (Denise, 2010). In addition, 43% of the employees recruited in all the KRG's ministries received job information from friends or relatives. For instance, 55% of the employees in the Ministry of Planning are recruited with formal procedures (UNODC 2013).

Even though mass recruitment in the KRG institutions has witnessed some reforms by decreasing the number of public servants that are recruited every year, according to the KRG's Ministry of Labor and Social Affair (2012), more than 50,000 new employees were recruited in 2011, and close to 20,000 in 2012. In addition, 50% of this ministry's employees are recruited without formal procedures (UNODC 2013). This is perhaps because once in a while the Prime Minister office orders recruiting some new employees without consulting or following the procedural process or the legislations that have been established by the KRG for recruiting new employees in the public sector (KNN, Change movement website, 2012).

The KRRC's report in 2012 looked at this negative phenomenon at a wider range by examining various institutions or agencies. The report mentions the existence of a specific type of corruption that is similar to what has been identified as "grand" corruptions by Langseth (2006). For example, high ranking officials in the ministries and members on the boards or commissions that are in charge of rewarding the scholarships or of recruiting the new civil servants have practiced the grand type of corruption in Kurdistan. These public servants are involved in grand corruption because it is socially expected that these high- ranking employees should provide support for the people they know, not only for financial gains but also for showing loyalty to their relatives and friends (Jabary and Hira, 2013). In addition, this type of corruption is not just a fact that exists in the process of recruitment and promotion systems in Kurdistan, but also it is one way that leads this process of reform in developing nations (Caiden, 1991).

4.10 Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has examined corruption in Kurdistan, as a newly developed region under the leadership of the KRG's. This problem of corruption has been conformed by the KRG's commissions, KRRC, and protested against by the public in Kurdistan.

A high level of corruption exists within the KRG's institutions that has resulted low performance by the civil servants, and further political parties' intervention into public institutions' tasks (Dr. Barham Salih, 2012). Therefore, this paper has attempted to understand the natures and the type of corruption in Kurdistan. It also has examined the recruitment and the preparations that the KRG's has been conducting in managing corruption.The factors that contribute to corruption include lack of a responsible political leadership that is willing to provide a stable political environment. This stability in political environment is important because it offers more opportunities for the government's institutions and agencies to function and design their agendas respecting transparency and accountability. This is important because it allows the public agencies to consider these changes through a wider vision by designing the necessary polices and agendas for further effective developments (Howlett, 2011; Neo and Chen, 2007; Hira and Patiff, 2004; Salamon, 2002).

By considering the mentioned steps such as reforming the existing institutions or designing new ones with more clear responsibilities of skills required (Neo and Chen, 2007; Howlett, 2011; Salamon 2002; Hira and Patiff 2004;) a developing nation such as Kurdistan could have a high chance to decrease the level of corruption.

These reforms include establishing various institutions and boards with clear responsibilities and functions, and adopting effective mechanisms of recruitment that depend on merit for hiring the employees for the public sectors' institutions. Finally, even though in some developing nations, corruption exists along public servants tasks (Caiden 1991), by conducting and following these tasks, the chances for emerging transparent and less corrupt governance seems to be possible.

This study recognizes that the Kurdish region is still in the process of development. However, to make this process of development more fruitful, KRG needs to build the foundations of a stronger governing model to put a stronger hand on corruption at this early stage. One can appreciate that the KRG has conducted some limited reforms in the political structure. However, the KRG must focus its attentions on further reforms in its structural organizations. This should include introducing and applying stronger regulations and effective policies to deal with corruption and to increase the level of transparency in the public institutions. The KRG should create more agencies and institutions to make the implementation process of government's polices easier.

The KRG needs to design new institutions with clear policies for educating its public servants. These policies should introduce improved emphasis on ethics within the KRG's institutions. Even though some might argue that this is a long-term process, the KRG can accomplish this objective by shifting public perspectives on corruption. This shift in public opinion can be supported by reforming the recruitment system in the KRG ministries by putting more focus on recruiting with formal procedures, hiring public servants based on their skills and expertise. This will become an ideal image that encourages others to earn the same positions. Another way is to introduce new regulations through qualified agencies to keep track on corruption in the public sectors.

4.11 References

ADB/OECD, (2006). Anti Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific: Progress in legal and institutional reform in 25 Countries. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

Agere, S., (2002). Promoting Good Governance: Principles, Practices, and Perspectives. London: Commonwealth Secretariat

Agranoff, R., and McGuire. M. (1999).' Managing in Network Settings'. Policy Studies Review 16, no. 1:18-41.

Ashton, D, Green, F., James, D., and Sung, J. 1999. Education and Training for Development in East Asia. The Political Economy of Skill Formation in Newly Industrializing East Asian Economies. Rutledge: London and New York.

Baser, B. and Morgan, P. (2008). Capacity, Change and Performance. European Center for Development Policy Management, a report studies. Pp. 1-134.

Berg and Hjerm (2010). National Identity and Political Trust. Sweden: perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 11, No. 4, 390-4-7.

Berman E. M. et al, (2011). Human Resource Management in Public Service. UK, London: Sage Publications, Inc.

Bossaert D. (2003). Career Development as an Effective Tool to Enhance the Attractiveness of Public Employment. European Institute of Public Administration. Retrieved on April 24. 2014. http://www.dgaep.gov.pt/media/0601010000/grecia/SURVEY_ON_CAREER.pdf

Bourgon, J. (2010). The history and future of nation-building? Building capacity for public Result. International Review of Administrative Sciences, pp. 197-218.

Brinkerhoff, D. W., (2010). Developing in Fragile States. Public Administration and Development, 30, 66-78.

.........(2000). Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: and An Analytic Framework. Public Administration and Development. 20, pp. 239-252.

Brinkerhoff, D. W., and Johnson, R. W. (2009). Decentralized local governance in fragile state: learning from Iraq. Sage: International Review of Administrative Sciences. Pp. 586-607.

Brown J. A. (2006). What are we trying to Measure? Reviewing the Basics of Corruption Definition. In Measuring Corruption, edited by Charles Stamford et al. England, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, Pp. 57-80.

Caiden G. E. (1991). Administrative Reform Comes of Age. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co.

Crosby, B. L., (1996). Policy Implementation: The Organizational Challenge. Washington, DC, USA: World Development, Vol. 24, No. 9, pp. 1403-1415.

Denise N., (2010). The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post- Gulf War Iraq. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Dool, L. V. D., (2005). Making Local Government Work: An Introduction to Public Management for Developing Countries and Emerging Economies. Amsterdam. Utgeverij   Eburon.

Dobbins, J. (2003). American Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. Santa Monica: Rand Publication.

Dr. Barham S. (2012). Dr. Barham Salih's Farewell Speech as Prime Minister of KRG. Erbil. Official Website of Baham Salih. Retrieved on April, 2014.   http://www.barhamsalih.net/

Duit, A., and Galaz V. (2008). Governance and Complexity-Emerging: Issues for Governance Theory. Stockholm University: International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 21, No. 3. Pp. 311-335.

Eade, D. (1997). Capacity-Building: An Approach to People-Centered Development. UK:

Oxfam Publication.

Entessar N., (2010), "Kurdish Politics in the Middle East." Lexington, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. United Kingdom.

Flinders M. V., and Hugh McConnell, 1999. 'Diversity and Complexity: The Quango-Continuum'. In Quangos, Accountability and Reform: the Politic of Quasi-Government, ed. Matthew V. F. and Martin J. S. Fheffield: Political Economy Research Center, pp. 17-   39.

Fred-Mensah, B. K. (2005). Social Capital Building as Capacity for Post-conflict   Development: The UNDP in Mozambique and Rwanda. Lynne Reiner Publishers. USA. Retrieved on   June 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800541

Fritzen, S., (2006). Beyond 'political will': How institutional context shapes the implementation of anti-corruption policies, Policy & Society, 24(3): 79-96

Green R. J. (2011). Rewarding Performance: Guiding Principles; Custom Strategies. New York. Rutledge.

Hira, A., and Parfitt, T. (2004). Development Project for a New Millennium. USA: Praeger.

Howlett, M. (2011). Designing Public Policies: Principles and Instruments. New York: Rutledge.

...........(2009). Policy analytical capacity and evidence-based policy-making Lessons from Canada. Canada: Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 153- 175.

James, V. U. (1998). Building the Capacities of Developing Nations through Empowerment. In Capacity Building in Developing Countries: Human and Environmental Dimensions, edited by Valentine Udoh James. Pp. 1-12.

Kenny S. and Clarke M. (2010). Challenging Capacity Building: Comparative Perspectives. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kettl D. F., (1999). Managing Indirect Government." Tools of Government: A Guide to the   New Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 490- 510.

Klingner, D., E., (1996). Public Personnel Management and Democratization: A View from Three Central American Republic. Public Administration Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, Pp. 390- 399.

KRG- MOP, (2011). Training Development Plan 2011. Erbil. Retrieved on May 2012). http://www.mop-krg.org/index.jsp?sid=1&id=204&pid=106

.........(2010). Contributions of the Republic of South Korea to Kurdistan Region from 2004 to the End of 2010. G.D. of Development and Coordination.

KRG-MOF (2012a). The 2012 Budget of Kurdistan. Retrieved on September 2012. http://www.mof-krg.org/files/articles/160812062555.pdf

..........(2012b). Finance Instruction No. (31) On November 30, 2011. Retrieved on April, 2014: http://www.mof-krg.org/files/articles/33.pdf

.........(2009) "Report on Donor Contributions to Kurdistan Region." Retrieved on April, 2014: http://www.mop-krg.org/

KRG-MHESR (2009). A Vision for the Future of Higher Education in Kurdistan. Erbil.   Retrieved on March 2014. http://www.mhe-krg.org/node/60

KRG-MLSA, (2012). The Number of Recruited public employees in the last three years. Retrieved on April 2014: http://www.molsa-krg.com/aboutministry.aspx

Leman K. C., 2002.' Direct Government'. In the Tools of Government: a Guide to the   New Governance. New York: Oxford University Press: 2002. 48- 79.

Lindquist, E., and Desveaux, J., (1998). Recruitment and Policy Capacity in Government. Ottawa: Public Policy Forum.

Langseth P., (2006). "Corruption Definition and Measurement." In Measuring Corruption edited by Stamford et al. England, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, Pp. 7-44.

Makiya K., (1989) "Silent and Cruelty." University of California Press, London, England.

Masciulli and Knight, (2009). Contemporary Theories of Political Leadership. In The Ashgate Research Companion: Political Leadership, Edited by Masciulli et al. Ashgate Publishing Limited. Pp. 89-122.

McDowall. D. (2000). The Kurdish question: a historical review. The Kurds: A contemporary Overview. In Philip G. K. and Stefan S., Ed. New York, Rutledge. Pp. 8-25.

Natali Denise, (2010), "The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq." Syracuse University Press, New York.

Salamon, L. M., (ed.) (2002). Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1-47.

Smith T. B. (1973). The Policy Implementation Process. Policy Sciences 4, pp. 197- 209.

Stansfield Gareth R. V., 2003. Iraqi Kurdistan: political development and emergent democracy.New York: Rutledge Curzon.

Stoker, G. (1999). 'Diversity and Complexity: The Quango-Continuum'. In Quangos, Accountability, and Reform: the Politic of Quasi-Government, ed. Matthew V.

Flinders and Martin J. Smith. Fheffield: Political Economy Research Center, 40- 53.

Thomas J. W. and Grindle, M. S. (1991). Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

TICI (2011). Corruption Perception Index: How does your country Do? Germany, Berlin. Retrieved on May 2014. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/press

Rothberg, (2012). Making a difference in the developing World. Chicago: University of Chicago.

UN, (2008). Managing Knowledge to Build Trust in Government. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

.........(2005). Human Resources for Effective Public Administration in a Globalized World. New York: Division for Public Administration and Development Management. Retrieved on April 2014. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021329.pdf

UNDP, (2012). "Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract." New York: United Nations Development Plan. Pp. 1-120.

..........(2010). Drought Impact Assessment, Recovery and Mitigation Framework and Regional Project Design in Kurdistan Region. New York. Retrieved on June 2012. http://www.iq.undp.org/UploadedFiles/Sections/b78606de-ca61-   464a-   afcc-97d659eab03b.pdf

.........(2009). Primer Report on Capacity Building. New York. Retrieved on April, 2014. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/does-capacity-matter-capacity-development-group-report-2009/2163_CDG_Report_F02-FINAL.pdf

USAID Report (2009). Iraq Economic Recovery Assessment. New York: Nathan Associates Inc.

Webb, K., (2005). Sustainable Governance in the Twenty Century: Moving beyond Instrument Choice. In Designing Government: from Instruments to Governance, edited by Pearl L., Margaret M. Hill, and Michael H., McGill- Queen's University Press, 2005. Pp.